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Article 6 of the Paris Agreement established 
three approaches for countries to cooperate 
with each other: cooperative approaches under 
Art. 6.2, a new mechanism to promote mitiga­
tion and sustainable development under Art.
6.4, and a framework for non-market approach­
es under Art. 6.8. Detailed rules for these three 
approaches are currently being negotiated. 
This paper summarises the views submitted by 
Parties in March 2017 to identify points of con­
troversy and convergence. It builds on a previ­
ous paper which summarised views submitted 
in September 2016.
Compared to the 2016 round of submissions,
some conceptual advances can be noted. How­
ever, a number of issues continue to be contro­
versial with little indication of a convergence of 
views.
Raising Ambition 
While the Paris Agreement mandates that Art. 6 
should contribute to increasing climate ambi­
tion, not all submissions discuss this issue in de­
tail. Nonetheless, compared to the last round of
submissions there are substantially more views 
that raising ambition will need to be build into
the system. Suggestions include:




 making Art. 6.4 a tool for voluntary action 

by the private sector;
 
 requiring a discounting of reductions to 

achieve a global net reduction; 

 reviewing Art. 6 transfers in the 5-yearly 
stocktake and excluding Parties where 
transfers have not contributed to increas­
ing ambition from future participation;
 managing the supply of units to keep pric­
es stable.
Promoting Sustainable Development 
As in the past, there continues to be a split on 
whether the provisions on cooperative ap­
proaches and the new mechanism should in­
clude international provisions on the promo­
tion of sustainable development, or whether 
these should be left to the host countries. The 
submissions do not show any level of concep­
tual advancement compared to the previous 
round of submissions. 
Promoting Environmental Integrity 
While some note that there is no clear, univer­
sally adopted definition of the term, most sub­
missions converge on a view that environmen­
tal integrity means that one carbon unit 
represents one ton of CO2e and is counted only 
once towards a commitment.  
One submission posits that environmental in­
tegrity should also address potential areas of 
conflicts with other environment-related as­
pects, for example, the conservation of biodi­
versity. 
Some Parties suggest that there should be limi­
tations on the use of transfers to protect from 
risks to environmental integrity. Suggestions 
include limiting eligibility to sectors that are 
quantifiable and easy to measure and provide 
lasting emission reductions, automatic cancel­
lation  of units after some time, or limiting the
share of target achievement that could be cov­
ered by transfers. 
Accounting Emissions
Many submissions call for regular ongoing re­
porting and accounting to take place in the 
context of the broader accounting under Article 


















Update on Submissions on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 
There still is controversy on whether participa­
tion in transfers should be limited to some
types of NDCs. While some argue that participa­
tion should be open to all kinds of NDCs, others 
consider that countries wishing to participate in
cooperative approaches and the new mitiga­
tion mechanism should be required to establish 
and quantify a budget of emission allowances 
or an annual trajectory of emissions towards 
their NDC objectives. 
Only one submission highlights that there is a 
risk that countries may oversell emission reduc­
tions. The submission suggests that this risk 
should be addressed under Art. 15 on compli­
ance. 
Scope and Governance of Cooperative Ap­
proaches 
In contrast to the previous round of submis­
sions, few of the recent submissions discuss the 
nature of ITMOs. However, there continues to 
be a split on what cooperative approaches are.
While some hold that the concept should in­
clude any kind of cooperation between two or 
more countries, others suggest that Art. 6.2 
should be analogous to Art. 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol and only provide for international
transfers of mitigation surpluses for the 
achievement of NDCs.  
There also continues to be a split on the ques­
tion to what extent rule setting and enforce­
ment for cooperative approaches should be 
done centrally, or be left to individual countries.
What Types of Activities under the Art. 6.4 
Mechanism?
Compared to the last round of submissions,
there seems to be a growing consensus sup­
porting an “inclusive” approach in which pro­
jects, programmes of activities and sectoral ap­
proaches should all be eligible under the 
mechanism.
Only few submissions discuss governance and 
methodological issues on Art. 6.4. There is this
little basis to identify convergence/divergence 
of views.
Transition from the CDM 
A number of Parties argue that CDM projects 
and credits should be transitioned into the new 
mechanism. They urge not to lose ongoing mit­
igation activities and to not further erode trust 
in carbon markets. On the other side, some  Par­
ties require more clarity on Art. 6 before dis­
cussing transition issues or note that projects 
would need to be fully re-assessed before being 
transitioned to Art. 6. 
Non-Market Approaches 
The submissions on non-market approaches are 
in essence repetitions of the last round of sub­
missions.  
Further Process
A number of submissions make suggestions on 
what questions to prioritise, but these priorities 
differ. Two submissions suggest to first identify 
a list of headlines for the further discussions be­





















1 Introduction  
Art. 6.1 of the Paris Agreement recognizes “that 
some Parties choose to pursue voluntary coop­
eration in the implementation of their national­
ly determined contributions to allow for higher 
ambition in their mitigation and adaptation ac­
tions and to promote sustainable development 
and environmental integrity.” 
Art. 6 subsequently establishes three ap­
proaches for countries to cooperate with each 
other:
 First, Art. 6.2 and 6.3 provides the option 
for Parties to directly engage in “coopera­
tive approaches” and to use “international­
ly transferred mitigation outcomes” in
achieving their NDCs. International super­
vision of these cooperative activities is not 
foreseen, but a work programme was 
agreed to develop guidance for Parties 
that want to engage in cooperative ap­
proaches.
 Second, Art. 6.4-6.7 establishes a new 
mechanism “to contribute to the mitiga­
tion of greenhouse gas emissions and sup­
port sustainable development”, referred to 
by many as “sustainable development 
mechanism”. In contrast to the cooperative 
approaches, this mechanism will be super­
vised by a body mandated by the Parties to 
the Paris Agreement. In addition, the Par­
ties are to adopt rules, modalities and pro­
cedures which must be observed when 
implementing activities under Article 6.4.
 Third, Art. 6.8 and 6.9 provides for the use 
of non-market approaches. Just how these 
approaches are to work will be determined 
in the coming years with the development 
of a “framework for non-market approach­
es”.
The task of developing the guidance for coop­
erative approaches, the rules, modalities and 
procedures for the new mechanism, and the 
framework for non-market approaches was 
mandated to the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA).
SBSTA conducted discussions at its sessions in
May and November 2016 and invited Parties 
and observers to submit views by 30 Septem­
ber 2016 and a second round of submissions by 
Parties by 17 March 2017.
This paper summarises the views submitted in 
the second round in March 2017 to identify 
points of controversy and convergence. It
builds on a previous paper which summarised 
the views submitted in September 2016.1 
This chapter will first synthesise the views on
cross-cutting issues and subsequently move to 
the three individual approaches under Art. 6.
 
1 Obergassel, Wolfgang (2016): Shaping the Paris Mecha­
nisms - A Summary of Submissions on Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement. JIKO Policy Paper 04/2016. Wuppertal Institu­




























Update on Submissions on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 
2Cross-Cutting Issues  
2.1 Overview 
All three Art. 6 approaches need to adhere to 
the cross-cutting principles established in Art.
6.1:
 Participation is voluntary for countries.
 Use of the cooperation mechanisms is to 
allow for raising climate action ambition, 
increasing the effort in terms of climate 
change mitigation or adaptation.
 The mechanisms are to promote sustaina­
ble development.

 The mechanisms shall ensure environmen­
tal integrity. 
Another cross-cutting issue is accounting and in
particular double counting. Art. 6.2 requires 
“robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the 
avoidance of double counting”, and Art. 6.5 
mandates that, “Emission reductions resulting 
from the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 
of this Article shall not be used to demonstrate 
achievement of the host Party's nationally de­
termined contribution if used by another Party 
to demonstrate achievement of its nationally 
determined contribution.”  
2.2 Raising Ambition 
Not all submissions discuss the issue of raising 
ambition in detail. Some posit that linking car­
bon pricing systems will by itself allow Parties 
to be more ambitious in their NDCs by making 
use of lower marginal abatement costs and/or 
foreign direct investment. However, compared 
to the last round of submissions there are sub­
stantially more views that raising ambition will 
need to be build into the system. 
Brazil posits that Article 6 must always be read 
in conjunction with the aims of the Paris 
Agreement, as established in its Article 2. 
Therefore, Article 6 should contribute to the 
necessary ambition for achieving the tempera­
ture goal, to increasing resilience and to mobi­
lizing finance 
Brazil posits that Parties wishing to engage in
the Art. 6.2 mechanism should quantify their 
mitigation commitments in terms of tCO2e 
that they will be limited to emit annually from
2020 in accordance with their communicated 
NDC. To safeguard ambition, Brazil suggests a 
mechanism similar to the Doha Amendment
to the Kyoto Protocol: In case the quantified 
tCO2e allowance in the NDC’s end year is higher 
than the average annual emissions during the 
years preceding the NDC’s timeframe, this dif­
ference multiplied by the number of years in
the given NDC time frame would be reserved 
for domestic use only and would not be eligible
for international transfers. 
In addition, any quantified units held in a Par­
ty’s national registry that are not used for NDC
achievement should in their view be transferred 
to a previous surplus reserve account for the 
subsequent NDC time frame. Units carried­
over from one NDC time frame to the next 
should not be eligible for trading.
Regarding Art. 6.4, Brazil argues that a key dif­
ference to the CDM is the aim “to incentivize 
and facilitate participation (…) by public and 
private entities” – while the demand for CERs 
under the CDM was originally driven by Annex I
Parties, in their view the reductions from the 
new mechanism could be used by any actor for 
any purpose. It could thus become a tool to en­





















The Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) 
suggests that the global stocktake under Art.
14 may consider to include reviewing the im­
plementation of Art. 6 and further potentials 
to contribute to raising global ambition. 
The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) posit
that any system developed under Article 6.2 
must be consistent with the objectives of the 
Paris Agreement. To that end, in their view any 
arrangement for the use of ITMOs must result in
a net reduction in emissions. To meet the net 
reduction requirement, all ITMOs must be dis­
counted. 
In addition, similar to Brazil, they argue that on­
ly quantifiable absolute reductions shall be 
eligible to be transferred. NDCs or sectors with­
in NDCs that have non-quantifiable or relative 
targets, such as relative to BAU or relative to 
GDP, would not be eligible. Furthermore, Par­
ties would need to establish a 5-year account­
ing system based on a 5-year quantified cap on 
emissions. 
Furthermore, they argue that as part of the 5­
yearly stocktake, a centralized mechanism
overseeing Art. 6.2 would review a Party’s
transactions over the previous 5-year period to 
determine whether the use of the ITMOs sys­
tem has contributed to higher ambition. Those 
Parties not meeting the requirements of this re­
view would not be eligible to use the ITMO sys­
tem in the subsequent 5-year cycle.
Moreover, they envisage a centralized oversight 
mechanism which would, inter alia, manage 
the supply of ITMOs to prevent over-supply 
and price volatility, for example through a mar­
ket stability reserve. 
The individual activities under Art. 6 should in
their view promote actions that further 
economy and sector-wide transformation or 
paradigm shift. Art. 6 should not lead to in­
vestments that would lock-in fossil fuel tech­
nologies.
2.3 Sustainable Development 
There continues to be controversy on whether 
there should be international provisions on 
the promotion of sustainable development, or
whether these should be left to the host coun­
tries. 
The African Group of Negotiators (AGN) sug­
gests that Parties involved must demonstrate 
how the MRV system safeguards environmen­
tal integrity and sustainable development. In
their view, criteria for sustainable development 
must be defined at the national level and 
progress must be monitored and judged at 
the national level through an appropriate des­
ignated national authority. An international 
tool like the CDM sustainable development tool
could be used on a voluntary basis. 
Similarly, Brazil posits that the promotion of 
sustainable development is a national prerog­
ative. They note that the United Nations 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development, reiter­
ates government’s primary responsibility for 
follow-up and review with respect to its imple­
mentation. In their view, it is therefore not ap­
propriate for the climate regime to propose any 
international definition on sustainable devel­
opment, nor to suggest how Parties should 
promote sustainable development domestical­
ly. 
The Arab Group and the like-minded devel­
oping countries (LMDCs) call for preserving 
national prerogatives through rules, modali­
ties and procedures that are impartial to NDC 
types and sustainable development priorities.
At the same time, they call for safeguards to 
identify and address negative social and 
economic impacts arising from the operation­
alization of cooperative approaches. 
The EIG calls for standards to promote sus­
tainable development. As a minimum, activi­
ties should in their view be consistent with the 
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ble development objectives and strategies of 
the Parties involved and be consistent with and 
represent no threat to human rights. In practical 
terms, this should in their view mean a suffi­
cient level of host country approval process 
and an international tool to assist countries 
and participants on sharing information on sus­
tainable development in their activities and the 
assessment thereof. 
The EU suggests that host parties will have to 
demonstrate how activities contribute to 
promote sustainable development and how 
the host party respects, promotes and consid­
ers its respective obligations on human rights
in line with the preamble of the Paris Agree­
ment.
The LDCs suggest that each Party shall estab­
lish a system to ensure local stakeholder con­
sultations, including Indigenous Peoples, in a 
manner that protects the right to full and effec­
tive participation of affected peoples and 
communities.
Japan and New Zealand suggest that report­
ing by Parties under Art. 13 should include 
how their activities promote sustainable devel­
opment.
2.4 Environmental Integrity 
The Paris Agreement mandates that Art. 6 is to 
promote environmental integrity. While some
note that there is no clear, universally adopted 
definition of this term, most submissions con­
verge on a view that environmental integrity 
means that one carbon unit represents one ton 
of CO2e and is counted only once towards a 
commitment. Some submissions highlight ad­
ditional aspects.
Brazil outlines that under Art. 6.2 environmen­
tal integrity is to be ensured by a robust ac­
counting framework. For Art. 6.4, environ­
mental integrity is to be ensured by its 
centralized nature, including a supervisory 
body and multilaterally-agreed rules, modali­
ties, procedures and governance structures.
Emission reductions will be monitored, verified, 
approved and certified in a process involving 
not only project developers, but also host Par­
ties’ national authorities, designated operation­
al entities and the multilateral supervisory 
body, under the authority and guidance of the 
Parties. 
Canada calls for ensuring that emissions reduc­
tions are properly quantified, unique, verifi­
able, and estimated using conservative 
baselines, and for ensuring that transfers of 
ITMOs should not result in increased emis­
sions. Canada also highlights the need for safe­
guards to address the risk of reversals of miti­
gation outcomes.
The EIG highlights the need for real mitigation 
outcomes based on credible reference levels, 
avoiding leakage and fraud, resulting in 
permanent mitigation outcomes, whereby 
irreversibility is ensured or measures to com­
pensate for a possible reversal are taken, with 
independent and competent verification, 
and reporting on all activities in a transparent 
way. They also call for setting the reference to 
calculate the emission reductions well below
BAU. 
The EIG also posits that environmental integrity 
should also address potential areas of con­
flicts with other environment-related as­
pects, for example, the conservation of biodi­
versity. 
New Zealand highlights that principles to en­
sure environmental integrity include that the 
transfer and use of ITMOs must not result in
an increase of global emissions; emissions 
reductions must be real, measurable, verifi­
able, additional, permanent; that there are 
national systems for data management and 
the provision of public information; that con­
sistent accounting is used; that there are 

























   
Wolfgang Obergassel 
Some Parties suggest that there should be lim­
itations on the use of transfers to protect 
from risks to environmental integrity.
The LDCs suggest that eligibility of sectors for 
both Art. 6.2 and Art. 6.4 should be limited to 
sectors that are quantifiable and easy to meas­
ure, provide lasting emission reductions, are 
beyond business as usual actions, and fulfil the 
necessary accounting system and require­
ments.
Venezuela suggests that 
 ITMOs cannot be bankable
 ITMOs, if not used, should be automatically
cancelled after a reasonable time. The time
for cancellation is to be examined as part 
of the stocktaking process but should be 
no longer than 5 years.
 ITMOs can only be transferred once from
 
the Party reducing emissions to the Party 





 ITMOs cannot be used for compliance of 

more than 20% of emission reduction tar­
gets contained in NDCs.
 
2.5 Accounting
2.5.1 General Accounting Issues 
Many submissions call for regular ongoing re­
porting and accounting to take place in the 
context of the broader accounting under Ar­
ticle 4.13 and the transparency framework 
under Article 13. 
The AGN suggests that Parties would have to 
report on ITMOs at the time of the exchange. 
ITMO transfers would be subject to reporting 
guidelines under Art. 13 and additional guid­
ance under Art. 6.2. ITMOs and transactions 
would be registered in a centralised registry 
operated by the UNFCCC Secretariat.
For Brazil, the 6.2 guidance should consist of an 
additional “layer” for the implementation of 
transparency commitments under Article 13 
and for NDC accounting under Article 4.13. 
Brazil maintains that Art. 6.2 is analogous to 
Art. 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, Arti­
cle 17 and related decisions should in their view 
serve as the basis for Art. 6.2 . 
As noted above, Brazil posits that Parties wish­
ing to engage in the Art. 6.2 mechanism should 
quantify their mitigation commitments in
terms of tCO2e that they will be limited to emit 
annually from 2020 in accordance with their 
communicated NDC. The quantified NDC would 
form a pool of quantified contribution units 
(QCU), each containing a unique serial number 
and other relevant information necessary for its 
identification and tracking.
The Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN) 
posits that emission reductions or removals will 
need to be covered by a national monitoring 
system, be reported through a national GHG 
inventory (Article 13.7), and be accounted for 
through a national registry in order to qualify 
for international transfer under Art. 6.2.
The EU suggests that accounting guidance
under Art. 6 should build on the general ac­
counting guidance to be elaborated under 
Art. 4.13, and on the reporting requirements 
under Art. 13. The EU suggests that Parties
wishing to use ITMOs toward their NDCs 
should provide, as part of their regular report­
ing under Art. 13:
 Initial Information, to enable Parties to 
address upfront how Article 6 guidance 
has been implemented domestically to 
provide an “accounting balance” as a basis 
of accounting; 
 Updated Information to track progress on 
implementation and use of ITMOs, and to 
facilitate regular corresponding adjust­
ment.
 Final Information regarding accounting,
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ITMOs, and to settle ‘corresponding ad­
justment’ in respect of achievement of the 
relevant NDCs. 
The EIG similarly notes that NDC accounting 
and accounting of ITMOs under Art. 6.2 and 
emission reductions under Art. 6.4 are closely 
related. Therefore, consistency of methods 
and methodologies for preparing national in­
ventories and for calculating ITMOs under Art.
6.2 and emission reductions under Art. 6.4 is re­
quired. They highlight compulsory use of tier 
3 for estimating emissions from the sector as 
well as the reduced emissions.
The EIG also suggests that Art. 15 on compli­
ance should address the risk that some Parties 
engaging in activities under Art. 6 may not fulfil
their NDCs. The EIG’s submission is thereby the 
only one that raises the risk of overselling. 
Japan notes that the Art. 6.2 guidance should 
facilitate the disclosure of information on the 
amount of credits/units which are issued,
acquired and transferred, retired and can­
celled by Parties respectively. Such information
should be made publicly available in a consoli­
dated manner through the work of the UNFCCC 
secretariat. For this purpose, the development 
of a format and reporting procedure should be 
developed and implemented in line with the 
modalities, procedures and guidance of the 
transparency framework defined in Article 13. 
New Zealand similarly suggests that account­
ing reports such as “transfer records” need to 
be included in Biennial communications and / 
or National Inventory Reports, recording 
ITMOs in tonnes transferred in or out, the Party 
to / from whom the transfer was authorised, by 
year, as well as recording the inventory emis­
sions total and an “ITMO-adjusted emissions to­
tal” showing the transfer of ITMOs.
The accounting guidance would describe re­
quirements for calculating and recording ITMO 
transfers, including definitions (e.g. ITMO), unit
of measurement, requirements to describe / 
calculate the NDC basis, how to make corre­
sponding adjustments, and how to calculate an 
“ITMO-adjusted emissions figure.” 
2.5.2 Accounting for NDC Diversity 
Past discussions had a strong focus on the im­
plications of the different forms and types of
NDCs. These discussions included controversies 
on whether eligibility to participate in Art. 6 
should be limited to some types of NDCs.
In the most recent submissions, the AGN, the 
Arab Group and the LMDCs posit that eligibil­
ity should be open to all types of NDCs.
The EU is somewhat non-committal, stipulating 
that guidance will need to cover cooperation
between “Parties with a range of NDC types”. 
As noted above, Brazil argues to tie eligibility 
to engage in the Art. 6.2 mechanism to a quan­
tification of mitigation commitments in
terms of tCO2e. The quantified NDC would form 
a pool of quantified contribution units (QCU),
each containing a unique serial number and 
other relevant information necessary for its 
identification and tracking. A Party engaging in
6.2 would then be able to demonstrate 
achievement of its NDC by holding an amount 
of units equivalent to what it has emitted dur­
ing the NDC time frame.
Similar to Brazil, the EIG argues that references 
contained in the NDCs regarding emissions and 
level of emissions to be achieved with the NDC 
need to be or to include an absolute number 
in terms of tCO2eq. That is, for accounting pur­
poses BAU-intensity or non-GHG targets would 
need to be translated into an absolute number 
in tCO2eq that would accompany the NDC. 
2.5.3 Corresponding Adjustments 
The COP decision adopting the Paris Agree­
ment in para 36 specifies that the guidance for 
cooperative approaches needs to include guid­























ed on the basis of a corresponding adjustment 
by Parties for both anthropogenic emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks covered by their 
nationally determined contributions under the 
Agreement”.
Previous discussions clarified that there are 
several types of double counting risks, includ­
ing double registration, double issuance, dou­
ble usage and double claiming.
Brazil posits that the quantification of NDCs 
in terms of quantified contribution units will 
not only ensure comparability of tradable units, 
but also provide a robust accounting frame­
work to ensure double counting is avoided. 
Parties wishing to engage in Art. 6.2 activities 
should in their view be required to establish 
and maintain a national registry to ensure the 
accurate accounting of the issuance, holding,
transfer, acquisition, cancellation and retire­
ment of units. For Parties that wish to engage in 
6.2 but do not want to maintain their own na­
tional registry, a “multilateral registry” should 
be made available by the secretariat.
The secretariat should also establish and main­
tain an international transaction mechanism
to verify the validity of transactions, including 
issuance, transfer and acquisition between reg­
istries, as well as cancellation and retirement of 
units.
Corresponding adjustments should occur in
every international transfer of mitigation out­
comes towards NDC, by means of additions 
and subtractions of tradable units acquired 
and transferred, respectively. 
Regarding Art. 6.4, Brazil argues that the initial 
forwarding of units from the 6.4 registry to 
the 6.2 multilateral/national registry does 
not constitute an international transfer and, 
therefore, the corresponding adjustment is
not applicable. A corresponding adjustment 
will only apply when a Party that has acquired a 
unit from the Art. 6.4 registry later transfers that 
same unit to a third Party. The Art. 6.4 activities 
would nevertheless be required to demonstrate 
additionality in relation to the NDC of the host 
Party. 
The EIG suggests that information necessary for 
corresponding adjustment in their view in­
cludes clear and transparent information on
the NDCs of participating countries, including
scope and coverage of the NDC; emissions 
pathway over the period corresponding to the 
NDC, such as definition of a multiyear GHG 
emissions budget; the period and/or year 
(vintage) of the ITMOs and how this infor­
mation is tracked; the share of ITMOs that will 
be used for achieving the NDC and information 
on any other use.
Each transfer of an ITMO shall be reported 
through the biennial (update) reports by the 
exporting and importing countries (double en­
try bookkeeping). The exporting country 
would add the quantity of CO2eq resulting 
from the activity to its reported emissions and 
the importing country would subtract the same 
quantity from its reported emissions in the in­
ventory. This information would be provided 
separately from the inventory in the context of 
tracking progress towards the achievement of 
the NDC. At the end of the NDC period, the net 
transfer of ITMOs over the period is to be re­
ported.
The EIG posits that government to government 
transfers do not necessarily require elaborated 
registries but only accounting formats and re­
porting procedures. However, allowing trans­
fers of ITMOs to other stakeholders would 
require registries. Parties that want to have 
registries but do not want to develop their own 
registry (because of capacities, costs, etc.) 
should have the possibility to do it under a sys­
tem managed by the UNFCCC Secretariat. 
Japan holds that it is extremely important to
avoid double counting and recalls that is has 
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The LDCs maintains that to avoid double 
counting all Parties that intend to transfer or 
acquire ITMOs must maintain a national regis­
try. In addition, all transactions must be ap­



















3 Cooperative Approaches  
3.1 Overview 
On Art. 6.2, two sets of issues continue to re­
ceive most attention: the scope of cooperative 
approaches and the scope of the guidance and 
governance.
3.2 Scope of Cooperative Ap­
proaches 
In contrast to the previous round of submis­
sions, few of the recent submissions discuss the 
nature of ITMOs. Those that do, AILAC and EIG,
posit that ITMOs should be expressed in terms 
of tonnes of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e).
There continues to be controversy on the scope 
of cooperative approaches in terms of types of 
cooperation. A number of submissions posit
that Art. 6.2 should be a bottom-up system al­
lowing for any kind of cooperation between 
Parties. These include AILAC, the AGN, Cana­
da, the LMDCs and Panama. 
The AGN, however, also posits that ITMOs 
should not be generally fungible and trada­
ble, they should only be used by Parties in­
volved in the primary cooperation. Only the Art. 
6.4 mechanism would result in generally fungi­
ble and tradable units.
Brazil maintains that Art. 6.2 is analogous to 
Art. 17 of the Kyoto Protocol and should not 
include linkages between domestic, subna­
tional or regional emissions trading 
schemes. To maintain environmental integrity, 
including such linkages would require imposing 
multilaterally-agreed rules and governance 
structures on each of the existing and new 
schemes. This would limit Parties’ policy space 
to develop their own schemes and require ex­
isting schemes to undergo significant changes 
to conform to the multilateral standards. 
Therefore, as under the Kyoto Protocol, domes­
tic, subnational or regional emissions trading 
schemes should in their view only be indirectly
relevant to the international regime, as part of 
countries’ domestic policies, to be reported in
their National Communications 
The CfRN recalls that Art. 5 of the Paris Agree­
ment recognises that the existing REDD+ 
Framework will be implemented as set out in
guidance and decisions already agreed under 
the Convention. In their view, the existing 
REDD+ Framework extensively addresses envi­
ronmental and social integrity concerns. There­
fore, once REDD+ results successfully complete 
the agreed process under the REDD+ Frame­
work and are posted on the UNFCCC’s REDD+ 
Information Hub, in their view those outcomes 
should be fully eligible for international trans­
fer under Art. 6.2, subject to the avoidance of 
double counting.
The Arab Group and the LMDCs posit that co­
operative approaches should not divert efforts 
from domestic efforts, which in their view are 
the primary focus of the Paris Agreement. Ac­
cordingly, in their view participation in cooper­
ative approaches should be subject to quan­
tity limits. 
3.3 Scope of the Guidance and 
Governance to Ensure Envi­
ronmental Integrity 
There continues to be a split on the question to 
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should be done centrally, or be left to individual
countries.
The Arab Group and the LMDCs posit that op­
portunities for cooperative approaches arise 
because of the diverse national prerogatives
that ultimately define NDCs and sustainable 
development. Accordingly, in their view the 
manner in which these cooperative opportuni­
ties are fostered must preserve these preroga­
tives and offer flexibilities that reflect their di­
versity. 
Similarly, Japan argues that it is the preroga­
tive of Parties to generate, transfer and use 
ITMOs. The scope of the international guid­
ance should in their view be limited to the 
accounting towards the achievement of NDCs,
while promoting sustainable development and 
ensuring environmental integrity and transpar­
ency, should be carried out under the responsi­
bility of the Parties engaging in the cooperative 
approaches.
By contrast, the AGN posits that governance of 
Art. 6.2 should involve a supervisory board. 
Governance would include responsibilities be­
fore and after implementation of activities, in­
cluding oversight over third-party verification.
They suggest that for the sake of consistency,
all the mechanisms of Art. 6 may have the same
supervisory board with 3 windows having spe­
cific functions to be defined.
As noted above, Brazil also envisages interna­
tional rules and governance to safeguard en­
vironmental integrity. 
The LDCs similarly maintain that Art. 6.2 shall 
be operated by centralized oversight, which
would be operated by the Secretariat under the 


















4 Article 6.4 Mechanism  
4.1 Overview 
Apart from cross-cutting issues as discussed in
chapter 2, the points raised in the submissions 
on the 6.4 mechanism particularly relate to the 
following issues: 
 Scope of the mechanism;
 Institutional Arrangements;
 Methodologies and accounting; 
 CDM transition issues.
4.2 Scope of the Mechanism
AILAC suggests that the mechanism should 
consider the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyo­
to Protocol as a basis. They also propose that 
the mechanism’s governing body could also al­
low other international mechanisms to gen­
erate mitigation outcomes, once they have 
gone through a process of periodic certifica­
tion. In addition, cooperative approaches under 
6.2 and the mechanism/s under 6.4 could be 
linked by transferring mitigation outcomes 
generated under the latter to cooperative ap­
proaches under 6.2.
They envisage that the mechanism could in­
clude a range of activities including project­
based, programmatic, sectorial and others. 
The AGN suggests that scopes of activities 
should be project-based and PoAs in all sec­
tors as a starting point. More scopes could be 
assessed in the future for inclusion under the 
mechanism, such as REDD+ or policy crediting.
Brazil stipulates that the scope, elements and 
requirements of Article 6, paragraphs 4 to 6,
and of paragraph 37 of Decision 1/CP.21 clearly 
indicate that the mechanism is analogous to 
the CDM. 
The CfRN notes that according to Art. 5 of the 
Paris Agreement REDD+ is to be implemented 
according to guidance and decisions already 
agreed under the Convention. Therefore, in 
their view REDD+ activities will likely not par­
ticipate under Art. 6.4 as any further decisions 
related to REDD+ would prejudice Art. 5.
The EU suggests that Art. 6.4 should facilitate 
participation by all Parties at the level of a pro­
ject, a programme or a sector. It should be 
applicable to various forms of cooperation, 
which may include the use as an instrument for 
offsetting, for climate finance and the promo­
tion of sustainable development. In addition,
they suggest that Parties may wish to use the 
mechanism to assist in implementation of do­
mestic instruments. In their view, this implies a 
more modulated architecture and different lev­
els of supervision, assessment, validation and 
registration. 
Venezuela opines that the mechanism could 
have many uses, and no alternative that any 
Party might deem of use should be excluded. 
4.3 Institutional Arrangements 
Brazil suggests that the supervisory body of 
the new mechanism should succeed to the 
CDM Executive Board in virtually all aspects, 
including, but not limited to, its rules of proce­
dure, code of conduct and guidelines for pan­
els/working groups. Similarly, the modalities 
and procedures for the CDM and other related 
decisions, including those adopted by the 



































rules, modalities and procedures for the new 
mechanism.
The EIG highlights the following responsibilities 
for the governing body:
 Develop tools and standards for addi­
tionality, baselines, MRV, permanence, and
others,
 Define procedures for ensuring that all ac­
tivities and emission reductions under Art. 
6.4 meet the criteria and rules that have 
been defined or will be defined,
 Be responsible for assessing conformity
 
of the activities with the tools and stand­
ards. 

Japan suggests that membership of the su­
pervising body should ensure better represen­
tation of all Parties than was the case in the 
CDM. It should in their view not be based on 
the Annex I and non-Annex I Party categories.
Panama notes that the governance of Art. 6.4 is 
fairly well defined in the Paris Agreement and 
the adopting decision, but there are nonethe­
less a number of issues for further discussion, 
including: composition of the supervisory body;
role of the supervisory body; responsibilities of
the different bodies involved in the process;
communication processes; any functions cur­
rently not fulfilled; relationship between the 
regulator and the other bodies for the different 
scopes of the mechanism; how to adapt a su­
pervisory body to more than one scope.
4.4 Methodologies on Addi­
tionality and Baselines 
The AGN suggests that MRV under the new 
mechanism should build on the CDM project 
cycle process and third party verification sys­
tem.
Brazil suggests that Art. 6.4 activities would be 
required to demonstrate additionality in rela­
tion to the NDC of the host Party. In the con-
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text of article 6.4, a business-as-usual scenario is 
in their view a scenario in which Parties are ex­
pected to implement their NDCs and associated 
national policies.
The EIG outlines a number of requirements for 
the demonstration of additionality: 
 Additionality of activities shall be periodi­
cally reassessed. In case an activity is not 

additional any more, crediting shall stop. 

 Activity types with high risk of non­
additionality shall be excluded. 





 Conservative assumptions shall be made
when estimating the emission reductions.
 Baselines shall be set well below con­
servative estimates of current efforts. 

 Shorter crediting periods as the usually 

applied ones should be used where ap­
propriate.
 
 All policies (national, regional, local) 

shall be accounted in the baselines. 

 Dynamic changes in baselines shall be
applied in order to take into account 
changes in technologies, developments of 
policies, etc. 
 Rules shall be set for avoiding leakage 
and addressing fraud and inaccuracies 
from errors, taking into account materiali­
ty. 
 Activities shall ensure irreversibility, or in
case of reversibility, measures to compen­
sate for a possible reversal shall be imple­
mented.
The EU similarly outlines a list of requirements 
to ensure environmental integrity and ambi­
tion: 
 baselines are to be much more ambi­
tious from the beginning, e.g. by using 

























 baselines may need to be dynamically
updated, and crediting periods will need
to reflect NDC timelines and enable pro­
gression of ambition and scope;
 rules implementing additionality require­
ments will need to be reconsidered and
strengthened given experience to date, the 
presence of NDCs, national policies and al­
low for increasing of ambition.
The LDCs suggest that a hybrid approach
should be applied in the establishment of the 
new mechanism: If a project activity is carried 
out in a sector outside the NDC, similar rules as 
in the CDM should apply; if a project activity is
carried out in a sector within the NDC, rules 
similar to Joint Implementation should apply.
Similar to the EIG, they suggest that the Board 
may create a positive list of activities that 
have a high likelihood of additionality. Such 
projects would be the only ones eligible.
They also suggest that crediting periods 
should be limited and subject to review so as 
to account for the working life of technologies 
and changes in additionality due to technologi­
cal progress through time. The Review should 
follow 5-year cycles, around the 5-year stock­
take under Art. 14.
4.5 Transition from the CDM
A number of Parties argue that CDM projects 
should be transitioned into the new mecha­
nism.
The AGN urges not to lose mitigation activi­
ties on the ground and their scaling up poten­
tial due to the regime change. 
Brazil argues that the ability of the climate re­
gime to ensure continuity and a smooth transi­
tion from the CDM to the new mechanism will 
be key to the reputation of the Convention. A 
smooth transition in their view entails assur­
ance on (i) the use of existing CDM methodol­
ogies and the accreditation system under; (ii) 
the continuation of issuance to registered CDM
projects; and (iii) eligibility of existing CDM
CERs. 
Panama similarly argues that not ensuring a 
smooth transition from the Kyoto mechanisms
to the new Art 6.4 will certainly further erode
trust in carbon markets.
The EIG is open to transitioning projects but 
notes that this may involve that projects are 
adapted to the new rules and fully reas­
sessed if they fulfil the new requirements, es­
pecially regarding additionality, baselines and 
the application of the accounting rules of Art. 6.
The EU stipulates that the mechanisms defined 
under the Kyoto Protocol shall not continue 
after the second commitment period. Substan­
tive discussion of transitional arrangements 
should in their view only occur on the basis of 
agreement on the core elements of the im­
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5Non-Market Approaches  
The submissions on non-market approaches 
remain at a rather general level. They mostly re­
volve around defining non-market approaches 
and identifying possible ways forward for the 
discussion.
Most submissions define nonmarket ap­
proaches as cooperative approaches where no 
transfer of units occurs. These submissions in­
clude the AGN, AILAC, AOSIS, the EIG, and 
the LDCs.
The AGN suggests that the framework for non­
market approaches must enhance the linkag­
es and synergies between existing mecha­
nisms without duplication and provide funding 
for developing countries’ NDCs. They suggest 
to organise a process under a coordinating 
body to collect suggestions from Parties and 
accredited observers on where linkages and 
synergies can be promoted by the framework.
They opine that a tracking and/or reporting 
mechanism is needed because potential miti­
gation and adaptation outcomes will be used
against Parties’ NDCs. 
AILAC suggest to limit the work programme 
to initiatives that are not developed any­
where else under the UNFCCC. They suggest 
that examples could be development of NA-
MAs, reduction of black carbon and joint ini­
tiatives for the conservation of oceans and 
other ecosystems. 
AOSIS suggests that the work programme 
could build on the outputs of the Technical
Examination Process on Mitigation (TEM) 
and the Technical Examination Process on 
Adaptation (TEP-A). Initial topics for the work 
programme could include progressing on the 
reduction, removal or reform of fossil fuel sub­
sidies; increasing deployment of renewable en­
ergy technologies in power generation; or op­
portunities to phase out inefficient and pollut­
ing technologies.
The work programme modalities could explore 
policy approaches Parties have undertaken 
or are planning to take in implementing their 
NDCs, to leverage and generate mitigation and 
adaptation co-benefits. The outputs of the work 
programme may provide input to the Green 
Climate Fund or to other initiatives. 
The EIG highlights that it is crucial that discus­
sions under Art. 6.8 do not duplicate other 
work under the UNFCCC and in other multilat­
eral fora. They suggest examining concrete 
and relevant areas of cooperation such as 
encouraging the use of international sustaina­
bility standards and global environmental la­
bels, removal of inefficient fossil fuels subsidies 
and encouraging measures to lower climate­
related risks . 
The EU reiterates the proposal in its previous 
submission on taking analytical steps to iden­
tify relevant non-market instruments, exist­
ing linkages and synergies and opportuni­
ties to increase linkages and synergies. As
others, the EU cautions against duplicating 
work under other provisions of the Paris 
Agreement.
The LDCs list some approaches that could be 
applied, such as appliance efficiency standards, 
fuel economy standards, feed-in tariffs, joint 
adaptation and mitigation activities such as 
planting trees on lands subject to the effects of 
climate change.
In their view, non-market approaches should 
focus on capacity building and technology 











excellence to assist Parties engage in low car­
bon economy technologies.
The LMDCs suggest to develop a registry of 
needs identified by Parties for the implemen­
tation of their NDC, complemented by a facility 
to match the articulation of needs with fi­
nance, technology transfer and capacity 
building. In addition, they suggest establish­
ment of an information-sharing process for 
the development and implementation of non­
market approaches at the national, regional,
and international levels, including sharing of 
best practices and lessons learned.
Uganda proposes the establishment of an Ad­
aptation Benefits Mechanism (ABM). They 
envisage the ABM as a results-based mecha­
nism to create incentives for the private sec­
tor to finance the incremental costs of activities 
with the view to deliver adaptation, joint adap­
tation & mitigation and other benefits.
The ABM incentives will be in the form of meas­
urable and verifiable units, for instance Adapta­
tion Benefit Units (ABUs). ABUs would not be 
transferrable to third parties, but could only be 
forwarded from project owner to investor.
They envisage that investors will be incentiv­
ized by the prospect of receiving verifiable and 
credible ABUs in exchange for funding, which 
will help them justify, communicate or demon­
strate how their investments are helping to 
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6 Further Process  
AILAC calls for prioritizing discussions on the 
definition of ITMOs, accounting of ITMOs, 
the modalities of the 6.4 mechanism and the 
relationship between Articles 6.2 and 6.4. 
The AGN suggests to first work on operational­
ization of overall mitigation under Art. 6.2 
and 6.4, operationalization of the share of pro­
ceeds under Art. 6.2 and 6.4, and options for 
corresponding adjustments. 
The Arab Group maintains that the develop­
ment of Art. 6.8-6.9 should move together 
with and complement Art. 6.2 and 6.4. 
Canada suggests to agree promptly on key 
elements of and timelines for a Work Pro­
gramme to make Art. 6.2 operational. To this
end, SBSTA 46 should agree on issues that can 
serve as headings for the development of 
guidance. Canada suggests:
 Maintaining Flexibility to Facilitate Bottom­
up Approaches to Carbon Markets 
 Quantifying and Reporting Emissions Re­
duction Units
 
 Ensuring Robust Accounting and the 

Avoidance of Double-Counting 

 Ensuring Consistent Measurements of Mit­
igation Outcomes that will be Transferred
Internationally 
 Ensuring Transparency 
 Ensuring Environmental Integrity 
Canada also suggests to identify overlaps and 
interactions with articles 4 and 13, and their 
significance for work leading up to COP 24.
At COP23, in Canada’s view Parties should 
agree on the scope of the guidance on Art. 6.2,
agree on a common understanding of what 
constitutes and does not constitute an ITMO, 
address ITMOs derived from reductions that 
are outside the scope of NDCs, and how to 
correspondingly adjust to ensure that double­
counting is avoided.
Canada also suggests a Work Programme de­
velop underlying principles and a mandate for 
the Art. 6.4 mechanism and its supervising 
body. In Canada’s view, modalities and proce­
dures for Art. 6.4 can be established later 
than COP24. 
The EU holds that all decisions related to the 
voluntary cooperation under Article 6 should 
be finalised by COP24 in order to provide cer­
tainty for Parties and practitioners. Regarding 
Article 6.2, Parties should first focus on report­
ing, accounting and governance arrange­
ments to secure robust accounting at national
and international level. Regarding Article 6.4, 
the EU suggests focusing on governance and 
design features which maintain, facilitate and
enhance ambition, and in particular how a host 
NDC is reflected in the mechanism, including 
through baselines and baseline approaches.
Regarding Article 6.8, the EU suggests focusing 
on core elements such as listing existing ap­
proaches, identifying synergies and how to en­
able their potential enhancement. 
Japan suggests to discuss and identify the el­
ements to be included in the guidance at 
SB46 in May 2017 and decide on the elements 
to be included in a draft decision on the guid­
ance at SB47 in Bonn in November 2017. The
draft guidance should be developed at SB48 in
May 2018 and finalized at SB49 to recommend 
a draft decision for adoption at COP24 in No­
vember 2018.
Kuwait notes that so far there is no clear defin­
itive definition of the non-market approach­






the secretariat and the co-facilitators to raise 
this issue at SBSTA 46. 
Similar to Canada, Panama suggests to focus 
on headings for the work programme to COP 
24, and ensure that this programme is defined 
at the end of SB 46. Once the headings are de­
fined, Parties can focus on substantive discus­
sions and define options.
New Zealand suggests that next steps should 
include synthesis reports and technical pa­
pers prepared by the secretariat as well as 
workshops to develop elements of the guid­
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7 Summary and
Conclusions  
Compared to the 2016 round of submissions,
some conceptual advances can be noted. How­
ever, a number of issues continue to be contro­
versial with little indication of a convergence of 
views.
Raising Ambition 
Not all submissions discuss the issue of raising 
ambition in detail. Some posit that linking car­
bon pricing systems will by itself allow Parties 
to be more ambitious in their NDCs by making 
use of lower marginal abatement costs and/or 
foreign direct investment. However, compared 
to the last round of submissions there are sub­
stantially more views that raising ambition will 
need to be build into the system. The sugges­
tions include: 




 making Art. 6.4 a tool for voluntary action 

by the private sector;
 
 requiring a discounting of reductions to 

achieve a global net reduction; 

 reviewing Art. 6 transfers in the 5-yearly 
stocktake and excluding Parties where 
transfers have not contributed to increas­
ing ambition from future participation;
 managing the supply of units to keep pric­
es stable.
Promoting Sustainable Development
As in the past, the views on sustainable devel­
opment mainly revolve around the question of 
whether the provisions on cooperative ap­
proaches and the new mechanism should in­
clude international provisions on the promo­
tion of sustainable development, or whether 
these should be left to the host countries. In
particular developing countries posit that sus­
tainable development issues are a national pre­
rogative and should therefore not be subject to 
multilateral analysis under the UNFCCC. Others 
suggest that the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals provide a universal definition of sustaina­
ble development that could be used for as­
sessing activities.
The submissions do not show any level of con­
ceptual advancement compared to the previ­
ous round of submissions. 
Promoting Environmental Integrity 
While some note that there is no clear, univer­
sally adopted definition of the term, most sub­
missions converge on a view that environmen­
tal integrity means that one carbon unit 
represents one ton of CO2e and is counted only 
once towards a commitment.  
One submission posits that environmental in­
tegrity should also address potential areas of 
conflicts with other environment-related as­
pects, for example, the conservation of biodi­
versity. 
Some Parties suggest that there should be limi­
tations on the use of transfers to protect from 
risks to environmental integrity. Suggestions 
include:
 Limiting eligibility to sectors that are quan­
tifiable and easy to measure and provide 
lasting emission reductions,
 ITMOs should not be bankable
 ITMOs, if not used, should be automatically






















 ITMOs should only be transferred once 

from the Party reducing emissions to the 

Party receiving the ITMOs for compliance 

with their NDC. 

 Limiting the share of NDC achievement 

that could be covered by ITMOs.
 
Accounting Emissions
Many submissions call for regular ongoing re­
porting and accounting to take place in the 
con-text of the broader accounting under Arti­
cle 4.13 and the transparency framework under 
Article 13.
There still is controversy on whether participa­
tion in transfers should be limited to some 
types of NDCs. While some argue that participa­
tion should be open to all kinds of NDCs, others 
consider that countries wishing to participate in
cooperative approaches and the new mitiga­
tion mechanism should be required to establish 
and quantify a budget of emission allowances 
or an annual trajectory of emissions towards 
their NDC objectives. 
Most submissions emphasise the need for regis­
tries, with some suggesting that an internation­
al registry should be available for countries that 
do not wish or are not able to establish a na­
tional registry. 
One submission highlights that there is a risk 
that countries may oversell emission reduc­
tions. The submission suggests that this risk 
should be addressed under Art. 15 on compli­
ance. 
Scope of Cooperative Approaches
In contrast to the previous round of submis­
sions, few of the recent submissions discuss the 
nature of ITMOs. Those that do posit that ITMOs
should be expressed in terms of tonnes of CO2 
equivalent.
However, there continues to be a split on what 
cooperative approaches are.  While some hold 
that the concept should include any kind of co­
operation between two or more countries seek­
ing to transfer mitigation outcomes, others 
hold that Art. 6.2 should only provide for inter­
national transfers of mitigation surpluses for 
the achievement of NDCs. In their view Art. 6.2 
is not to cover domestic, subnational or region­
al emissions trading schemes. 
One submission posits that mitigation out­
comes resulting from the REDD+ Framework 
under the Convention should be fully eligible
for transfers under Art. 6.2.
Governance of Cooperative Approaches 
There also continues to be a split on the ques­
tion to what extent rule setting and enforce­
ment for cooperative approaches should be 
done centrally, or be left to individual countries.
Some countries propose to provide flexibility to 
“bottom-up” approaches, where Parties them­
selves would demonstrate environmental in­
tegrity. Other countries posit that oversight by 
the implementing countries alone is not suffi­
cient to ensure environmental integrity. They 
maintain that integrity can only be ensured if 
rules and governance structures are multilater­
ally-agreed and accountable to all Parties to the 
Paris Agreement.  
What Types of Activities under the Art. 6.4 
Mechanism?
Compared to the last round of submissions,
there seems to be a growing consensus sup­
porting an “inclusive” approach in which pro­
jects, programmes of activities and sectoral ap­
proaches should all be eligible under the 
mechanism. Only one submission envisages the 
mechanism to operate only at the project level,
with rules very similar to those of the CDM. 
Only few submissions discuss governance and 
methodological issues on Art. 6.4. There is this
little basis to identify convergence/divergence 
of views.
Transition from the CDM 
A number of Parties argue that CDM projects 
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mechanism. They urge not to lose ongoing mit­
igation activities and to not further erode trust 
in carbon markets. On the other side, some Par­
ties require more clarity on Art. 6 before dis­
cussing transition issues or note that projects 
would need to be fully re-assessed before being 
transitioned to Art. 6. 
Non-Market Approaches 
The submissions on non-market approaches are 
in essence repetitions of the last round of sub­
missions.  
The Like-Minded Developing Countries reiter­
ate their suggestion that the framework should 
facilitate access to finance, technology transfer, 
and capacity building for mitigation and adap­
tation, and contributing to map and register 
needs of countries and assisting them in match­
ing them with means of implementation.
Other countries reiterate their concern to avoid 
duplication of work with other processes under 
the UNFCCC. They suggest to focus discussions 
on possible synergies and coordination in non­
market cooperation.
These countries also reiterate their suggestions 
for specific issues that could usefully be tackled 
under the new framework, such as fossil fuel
subsidy reform, or phasing inefficient and pol­
luting technologies.
Further Process
A number of submissions make suggestions on 
what questions to prioritise, but these priorities 
differ. Two submissions suggest to first identify 
a list of headlines for the further discussions be­





Wuppertal Institute  
for Climate, Environment and Energy 
P.O. Box 100480 
42004 Wuppertal 
GERMANY 
www.wupperinst.org 
  
